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Sexual Harassment: A Doctrinal Examination of the Law,
An Empirical Examination of Employer Liability, and
A Question About NDAs—
Because Complex Problems Do Not Have Simple Solutions
MICHAEL HEISE* AND DAVID SHERWYN**
The #MeToo movement casts critical light on the pervasive nature of sexual
harassment, particularly in the employment context, and continues to motivate a
number of initiatives that address important social and workplace ills. The problems
this movement has uncovered, however, run much deeper and likely exceed the scope
and capacity of many of the proposed “fixes” it has inspired. Worse still, however,
is that some of the proposed fixes may prove counterproductive. This Article
examines the history and development of the relevant employment laws, empirically
assesses judicial holdings on the employers’ affirmative defense to liability, and
argues that many employees may be better off with a nondisclosure agreement
(NDA) in many instances. Our conclusion sketches out the basic contours of an
alternative legal standard, a new affirmative defense, and related policy initiatives
that call into question the common perception that privacy benefits employers and
not employees.
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INTRODUCTION
Prior to October 5, 2017, sexual harassment persisted as just another
“employment discrimination issue.”1 Indeed, from 2010 to 2016 the average number
of reported sex-based harassment charges equaled 12,526, while the average number
of reported retaliation charges and race charges equaled 38,528 and 33,182,
respectively.2 After October 5, 2017, however, sexual harassment, and the resultant
employment discrimination, started a movement.3 At its most basic level, such a
movement is necessary and important. Sexual harassment is endemic to the United
States workplace and warrants far greater legal and public attention. Unfortunately,
the aftermath of the #MeToo revolution has too often been distracted by
misinformation and knee-jerk reactions that while, perhaps even well-intentioned,
may yet prove, in the end, counterproductive. One particularly critical—indeed,
structural—challenge is that one cannot efficaciously engage with the array of
problems that flow from sexual harassment in the workplace without first making
the relevant legal doctrines and procedures more coherent.
Part I seeks to place workplace sexual harassment claims into some context by
reviewing the number of sexual harassment claims filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In Part II we summarize the relevant legal
doctrines. Our focus here is organized into two distinct—though related—subparts.
In the first we trace the development of the relevant legal doctrines; the second
focuses on employer liability from an empirical perspective. Specifically, we analyze
summary judgment motions, drawn from published case reports, from 2010 to 2018.
Part III assesses one of the most notable “legal fixes” where employers can no longer
deduct expenses from settlements that include nondisclosure agreements (NDAs).
We argue that this “fix,” paradoxically, likely makes problems worse, not better, for
many employees. Finally, in Part IV we propose (1) an alternative definition of
sexual harassment; (2) a restructuring of an employer’s affirmative defense; and (3)
how to operationalize NDAs in a manner that better encourages employees to report
and employers to prevent and correct harassment.

1. See #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 4, 2021, 1:52 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html
[https://perma .cc/L9T6-5KPV].
2. Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010 – FY
2020, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/chargesalleging-sex-based-harassment-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2020 [https://perma.cc/BQ36QJ5X] [hereinafter Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment Filed with EEOC]; Charge
Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2020, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charge-statistics-charges-filed-eeocfy-1997-through-fy-2020 [https://perma.cc/6W9C-P9TS] [hereinafter Charges Filed with
EEOC].
3. October 5, 2017 was the day the Weinstein accusations became public. See also
#MeToo: A Timeline of Events, supra note 1.
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I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS’ PREVALENCE
Prior to filing a sexual harassment claim in federal or state court, an employee
must first file a “charge” with the EEOC or their state agency (forty-seven states
“protect” sex).4 Of course, employee charges filed with the EEOC systematically
undercount the larger universe of employee complaints of work-based sexual
harassment, including those issues or matters (1) adjudicated under an in-house
dispute resolution system; (2) resolved prior to an employee’s EEOC filing; or (3)
more troubling, never filed by an employee, who instead endures the odious conduct
and/or leaves the company. Still, despite systematically undercounting instances of
sexual harassment, EEOC claims data do reflect the number of cases that have been
processed in the traditional legal system and provide helpful context with regard to
how sexual harassment in the workplace compares to other discrimination claims.
Helpful critiques of the adjudication system necessarily rely upon useful measures
of the issues’ breath, scope, and contour.
Before delving into the relevant data, it is instructive to consider why employees
file with either the state or federal agencies. In three states, employees have no
choice—they must file with the EEOC because their state does not protect against
sexual harassment.5 Other employees can only file with the state because they work
for an employer with fewer than fifteen employees, and thus are not covered by the
EEOC,6 but live in a state whose law applies to employers with fewer than fifteen
employees.7 Employees who work for employers covered by relevant federal and
state or local law, however, have more legal options. In many cases, the state or local
law is more employee friendly with regard to law, damages, and/or adjudication
systems. For example, Illinois and California provide strict liability for harassment
by supervisors,8 both California and New York City provide unlimited punitive
damages for discrimination,9 and Illinois provides administrative hearings that are

4. Discrimination – Employment Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 27,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/discrimination-employment
.aspx [https://perma.cc/EBK3-SY4N] [hereinafter NCSL]. Only Alabama, Georgia, and
Mississippi do not protect sex discrimination for private employers. Id.
5. Employees in Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi must file with the EEOC rather than
state agencies because their state agencies do not protect discrimination on the basis of sex.
Id.
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2009). The Act defines an
“employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” Id. § 2000e(b).
7. See NCSL, supra note 4. For example, New York law applies to employers with four
employees or more and Colorado law applies to employers with one or more employee. Id.
8. See Sangamon Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 908 N.E.2d 39, 44–
46 (Ill. 2009) (interpreting Illinois’s state version of Title VII as imposing strict liability on an
employer for the sexual harassment of an employee by the employee’s direct supervisor); see
also State Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Superior Ct., 79 P.3d 556, 563 (Cal. 2003) (holding that
“an employer is strictly liable for all acts of sexual harassment by a supervisor” (emphasis
omitted)).
9. Compare CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2019), with Civil Rights Act § 7, and
Chauca v. Abraham, 89 N.E.3d 475, 480–81 (N.Y. 2017) (holding that punitive damages are
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less formal and less restrictive than federal court.10 Moreover, some plaintiffs’
lawyers believe that state court judges and juries are more employee friendly than
those in federal court.
The EEOC differentiates sex-based harassment charges and sexual harassment
charges. Sexual harassment is defined as conduct of the sexual nature. Sex-based
harassment is nonsexual conduct that is motivated by the gender of the victim.11 As
explained more fully below, we contend that after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services12 there is no legal basis for the distinction.
Regardless, the EEOC statistical reports provide the number of sexual harassment
claims, along with the total number of sex-based and sexual harassment charges
combined, allowing us to see that sexual harassment cases made up 58% of the total
sexual harassment and sex-based harassment charges from 2010 to 2019.13 The
EEOC’s resolution data, by contrast, is limited to sexual harassment cases only.
Below, we provide numbers of receipts from the larger, inclusive category, and
resolutions from the smaller, exclusive category because, as stated above, it is the
only set of numbers we have.
From 2010 to 2019, the number of sex-based harassment claims filed with the
EEOC averaged 12,627 cases per year.14 With regard to the percentage of sexual
harassment cases relative to all other types of discrimination cases, sexual
harassment claims ranged from a low of 12.47% (2011: 12,461 out of 99,947
received) to a high of 17% (2018: 13,055 out of 76,418 received) of the charges the
EEOC received.15 While 12.47% to 17% seems significant, the EEOC percentages
do not add up to 100 percent. Because an employee can claim numerous forms of
discrimination (e.g., sexual harassment, age discrimination, and retaliation) in a
single filing, the percentages exceed 100 percent every year. For example, in 2018
the percentages added up to 188.9%, and the number of retaliation (51.6%), race
(32.2%), disability (32.2%) and age (22.1%) claims exceeded that of sexual
harassment in 2018 and every other year going back to 2010.16 Thus, in 2019, the

appropriate under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) where the defendant’s
actions amount to recklessness or willful or wanton negligence, or where there is “a ‘conscious
disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard’”
(quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Products Corp. 550 N.E.2d 930, 934 (N.Y. 1990)). The
court’s decision in Chauca makes clear that the standard for punitive damages under the
NYCHRL is broader and more plaintiff-friendly than under Title VII, which requires a
showing that the employer had intentionally discriminated with “malice” or with “reckless
indifference.” Id. at 480.
10. For a full discussion of the Illinois Human Rights Commission Process, see David
Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail
to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law
Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000).
11. Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010-FY
2020, U.S. EEOC (2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charges-alleging-sex-basedharassment-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2020 [https://perma.cc/TP4J-G27V].
12. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
13. See Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment Filed with EEOC, supra note 2.
14. Id.
15. Id.; Charges Filed with EEOC, supra note 2.
16. Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment Filed with EEOC, supra note 2; Charges
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number of sexual harassment charges were approximately one-third of the number
of retaliation claims, around one-half the number of race and disability claims, and
three-quarters of the age cases.17
In terms of claim resolution, sexual harassment was more “employee friendly”
than dispositions for other charges resolved during that same time period. More
specifically, from 2010 to 2019, while merit resolutions18 for sexual harassment
claims ranged from 25.9% (2010) to 22.4% (2017) for an average of 24.21%,19 total
EEOC merit resolutions ranged from 19.2 percent (2010) to 14.8% (2017), with an
average of 17.22%.20
Three reasons may help explain why the percentage of merit resolutions in sexual
harassment classes exceeded those for other protected classes. First, sexual
harassment claims could be more meritorious. Second, merit resolutions include
settlements. Since current employees often bring harassment charges, parties can
settle for lower sums of money or no money at all. Additionally, the facts can be so
embarrassing that employers will, to avoid publicity, quickly agree to settle at an
early stage in the legal process. Third, investigators may be more bothered by sexual
harassment allegations than those presented in other cases and systematically
preference employee claims over employer defenses. Still, that only, on average,
24.21% of sexual harassment cases warranted a merit resolution raises an important
question: Is the EEOC’s resolution system systematically skewed against employees
or are 75% of the harassment charges truly without merit?
Further empirical investigation does not shed much helpful light. Of all EEOC
resolutions, an average of 21.37% over the ten-year period of our study are classified
as administrative closings.21 Administrative closings include those employee claims
that contain structural defects (e.g., the employer had fewer than fifteen employees)
as well as employee claims that were abandoned (e.g., the process took too long, so
the employee got a new job and wanted to put the whole episode in the past). The

Filed with EEOC, supra note 2.
17. Charges Filed with EEOC, supra note 2.
18. Merit resolutions consist of “[c]harge[s] resolved with an outcome favorable to
charging party or charge with meritorious allegations. These are comprised of negotiated
settlements, withdrawals with benefits, successful conciliations, and unsuccessful
conciliations.” Definitions of Terms, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (May 2020),
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/definitions-terms [https://perma.cc/N6FV-3JRJ]. Nonmerit
resolutions consist of administrative closures, “[c]harge[s] closed for administrative reasons
without a determination based on the merits, which include: lack of jurisdiction due to
untimeliness, insufficient number of employees, or lack of employment relationship; charging
party requests withdrawal without receiving benefits; or charging party requests the notice of
right to sue.” Id. No reasonable cause is the “EEOC's determination based upon the evidence
obtained in the investigation that it believes discrimination did not occur; the determination
does not certify that the respondent is in compliance with the statute. The charging party may
exercise the right to bring private court action.” Id.
19. Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment Filed with EEOC, supra note 2.
20. All Statutes (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 – FY 2020, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/all-statutes-charges-filed-eeoc-fy1997-fy-2020 [https://perma.cc/WPF7-QXG8] [hereinafter All Statutes (Charges Filed with
EEOC)].
21. Id.
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remaining nonmerit resolutions, an average of 67.04% of the total resolutions over
the nine-year period,22 involve charges where the EEOC investigated and found no
reasonable cause. Even more telling is that in cases where the EEOC investigated
and made a determination, they found no reasonable cause in approximately 90% of
the cases.23 Again, these data raise more questions than they answer. For example,
what are the circumstances behind the cases that result in administrative closings,
and is it really the case that 90% of the cases fully investigated had no merit?
II. THE LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Background
The law of workplace sexual harassment pivots on two separate questions. First,
what is sexual harassment? Second, when is an employer liable for the harassment?
We briefly take up each question below.
The first step in addressing what is sexual harassment is to acknowledge that there
is no federal statute that prohibits or even addresses sexual harassment in the
workplace.24 Moreover, scholars generally agree that when enacting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress did not contemplate that the statute’s prohibition
against discrimination based on sex would create a cause of action for employees
who were subjected to unwanted sexual advances without suffering any tangible
loss.25 Indeed, it is extremely difficult to ascertain what Congress intended because
the “protected class” enunciated as “sex” was added to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act two days before the vote on the bill.26 Some argue that the amendment was a
joke, while others claim it was proposed to kill the bill.27 Finally, there are those who
contend that the proponents sought to protect “poor” (i.e., economically

22. Id.
23. Id. We reach this conclusion by adding up all the “reasonable cause findings and the
no reasonable cause findings to calculate an “N” which is total findings of cause and no cause.
From that number we then determined the percentage each.
24. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (holding that sexual
harassment in the workplace constituted a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
25. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83
CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
congressional intent embodied in Title VII’s protection against sexual harassment in Meritor
Bank, 477 U.S. at 64); Michelle Angelone, Same-Sex Harassment Claims Under Title VII:
Quick v. Donaldson Co. Breathes New Life into the Post-Garcia State of the Law, 9 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 76–79 (1997) (discussing several courts’ interpretation of congressional
intent underlying sexual discrimination). “Tangible losses” occur when there is a material
change in employment, such as termination, failure to promote, demotion, or a change in
benefits. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
26. See generally Jo Freeman, How Sex Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a
Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163 (1991) (arguing that contrary to popular belief,
the addition of “sex” into Title VII was not a joke or an effort to kill the bill, but rather a result
of the National Women’s Party taking advantage of the opportunity the civil rights movement
created for activists).
27. Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex
Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55, 57–59 (2016).
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disadvantaged) white women who would be “left behind” by those protected by the
new law.28 Regardless of the possible motivation or motivations, there is little
legislative history,29 other than the “joke” read into the record by Howard W. Smith,
a Virginia congressman, Chair of the Rules Committee and, allegedly, a staunch
racist.30 Smith’s “joke” constituted a request from women to solve the problem that
that the U.S. population had more women than men because god could have not
wished for a society where every woman could not find a husband.31
Given the legislative history’s limited record and the gender composition of the
88th Congress—422 men and thirteen women in the House and ninety-nine men and
one woman in the Senate32—it is difficult to believe that Congress intended to
prohibit what we now refer to as sexual harassment. In fact, the legal theory and
concept did not make it into the public discourse until the mid-1970s.
In 1975, journalist Lin Farley, while teaching at Cornell University, handed out a
survey to 155 female respondents. According to their responses, 70% had
experienced sexual harassment, 92% of the women said it was a serious problem,
and more than 50% of the women who complained about the sexual harassment said
nothing was done about the behavior.33 Farley presented her results to the New York
City Commission on Human Rights in 1975 and, in 1978, published Sexual
Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job.34 Reaction to Farley’s
book, however, evidenced the resistance that Farley and other advocates confronted.
One review of Farley’s book dismissed her concerns about sexual harassment as
“often absurdly radical” and claimed “[t]he way Ms. Farley would have it, men are
lurching out of every file drawer to lech after women workers.”35 The review referred

28. See id. at 61–63 (arguing that the Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists, who
focused on increased protection for low-wage, non-unionized, working-class women, greatly
impacted the inclusion of “sex” in Title VII).
29. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2012) (“It is a commonplace in employment discrimination
law that Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination has no legislative history”).
30. See Mary Anne Case, No Male or Female, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 83, 90 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed.,
2011) (arguing that “Smith was unquestionably a racist”).
31. See, e.g., HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXBASED DISCRIMINATION 578–80 (4th ed., 1996). But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX
EQUALITY 17 (2001) (contesting the idea that Smith’s amendment is best characterized as
simply a “joke”); Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 765, 767–69 (2002) (“Smith and other legislators who supported the addition
of ‘sex’ understood what the legal academy has subsequently come to call
‘intersectionality.’”).
32. Women Members by Congress, 1917–Present, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/WIC
/Historical-Data/Women-Representatives-and-Senators-by-Congress/
[https://perma.cc
/JFW2-FYYB].
33. LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB
20–22 (1975).
34. See generally id.
35. Review of Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job, THE
KIRKUS REV. (Oct. 2, 1978), https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/lin-farley/sexual-
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to the descriptions of workplace abuses as being “ridiculous” and “flabby” and
concluded that Ms. Farley was “barking up a very shaky tree.”36
Ms. Farley’s shaky tree, however, grew stronger in 1979 when Professor
Catharine MacKinnon published Sexual Harassment of Working Women.37 In it,
MacKinnon defined sexual harassment in its broadest sense, as the “unwanted
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal
power.”38 The influence of her work on both courts and scholars was swift and
remains profound.39
In 1980, the EEOC expanded its “Guidelines on Discrimination Because Of Sex”
under Title VII to include sexual harassment.40 After the EEOC published its
guidelines, courts routinely held that hostile environment sexual harassment did in
fact create a cause of action.41
In 1986, the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson42 put to
rest any lingering questions concerning the legal efficacy of Farley’s and
MacKinnon’s theories that sexual harassment is both a social ill and a Title VII
violation. In a relatively short opinion, the Meritor Court (1) established sexual
harassment as a violation of Title VII;43 (2) held that there are two types of
harassment: quid pro quo (this for that) and hostile environment;44 and (3) provided
a basis for employer liability by “look[ing] to agency principles.”45 The creation of

shakedown-the-sexual-harassment-of-women/ [https://perma.cc/P8MV-629R].
36. Id.
37. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); see also Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual
Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1169–70 (1998) (discussing Professor MacKinnon’s
influential role in the development of sexual discrimination law).
38. See MACKINNON, supra note 37, at 1; see also Louis P. DiLorenzo & Laura H.
Harshbarger, Employer Liability for Supervisor Harassment After Ellerth and Faragher, 6
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 3, 4 n.8 (1999).
39. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method
Makes, 41 STAN. LAW. REV. 751 (1989) (reviewing all of Professor MacKinnon’s work and
discussing its profound influence on legal doctrine and practice).
40. The EEOC Guidelines define quid pro quo harassment as “[u]nwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature .
. . when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual.” 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985).
41. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Sexual
harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every
bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial
equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.”); see also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254–
55 (4th Cir. 1983); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 934–44 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zabkowicz v.
West Bend Co., 589 F.Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
42. 477 U.S. 57 (1986), aff’g sub nom. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
43. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
44. Id. at 65.
45. Id. at 70–72.
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a completely new cause of action without legislation proved to be problematic. With
no definitive statute, legislative history, or any other baseline for courts to turn to,
the district and circuit courts were forced to legislate based on one sentence in Title
VII and a seven-page Supreme Court decision. Clearly, the lower courts lacked
adequate guidance and the decisions that followed reflected that fact.
Although quid pro quo cases initially seemed fairly straightforward, defining
“hostile environment” created a divergence of opinions. As hostile environment
cases made their way through the courts, different circuits created different rules with
regard to hostile environment. Specifically, courts generally held that the conduct
must be: (1) sexual, (2) unwelcome, (3) severe or pervasive, (4) abusive or hostile,
and (5) because of sex.46 Some courts applied a sixth standard, holding that the
conduct must also cause psychological damage.47 The first four standards were fairly
consistent across appellate courts; standards five and six, however, created problems.
As explained below, the Supreme Court has addressed both the fifth and sixth
elements listed above. We examine the sixth before the fifth to stay true to the Court’s
chronology and because the effect of the fifth is much greater.
The requirement that the harassment cause psychological damage divided the
circuits. The Sixth Circuit,48 the Eleventh Circuit,49 and the Federal Circuit,50 for
example, each held that plaintiffs needed to prove that they suffered psychological
damage in order to prove hostile environment. The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, rejected
this standard.51 In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,52 the Supreme Court rejected the
psychological damage requirement and defined sexual harassment as “sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive environment.”53 The Court further defined the standard by holding that
severe or pervasive conduct had to create an objectively and subjectively hostile or
abusive environment.54 Thus, the Harris Court essentially defined hostile
environment as conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to be abusive and/or
hostile from an objective and subjective standpoint. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia
wrote:
“Abusive” (or “hostile,” which in this context I take to mean the same
thing) does not seem to me a very clear standard -- and I do not think

46. For a full discussion of the evolution of hostile environment cases, see Judith J.
Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment to be
“Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62
MD. L. REV. 85 (2003).
47. Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Refin. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (requiring serious effect on psychological well-being);
with Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510;
and Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292 (CA Fed. 1985), with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,
877–78 (rejecting such a requirement).
48. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
49. See Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1989).
50. See Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
51. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
52. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 22–23.
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clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb “objectively” or by
appealing to a “reasonable person[’s]” notion of what the vague word
means. Today's opinion does list a number of factors that contribute to
abusiveness, see ante, at 23, but since it neither says how much of each
is necessary (an impossible task) nor identifies any single factor as
determinative, it thereby adds little certitude. As a practical matter,
today's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related
conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough
to warrant an award of damages. One might say that what constitutes
“negligence” (a traditional jury question) is not much more clear and
certain than what constitutes “abusiveness.” Perhaps so. But the class of
plaintiffs seeking to recover for negligence is limited to those who have
suffered harm, whereas under this statute “abusiveness” is to be the test
of whether legal harm has been suffered, opening more expansive vistas
of litigation.
Be that as it may, I know of no alternative to the course the Court today
has taken. One of the factors mentioned in the Court's nonexhaustive list
-- whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance -- would, if it were made an absolute test, provide greater
guidance to juries and employers. But I see no basis for such a limitation
in the language of the statute. Accepting Meritor's interpretation of the
term “conditions of employment” as the law, the test is not whether work
has been impaired, but whether working conditions have been
discriminatorily altered. I know of no test more faithful to the inherently
vague statutory language than the one the Court today adopts. For these
reasons, I join the opinion of the Court.55
In other words, Scalia’s concurrence makes clear that he did not know what the
standard meant but that he could not think of anything better.
While Justice Scalia’s point is well-taken, the broader sexual harassment
jurisprudence did provide guidance to employers and employees by creating clarity
based on conduct and motivation. Lawyers analyzing sexual harassment cases could
classify the cases by putting them into one of two categories: sexual conduct and
nonsexual conduct. In sexual conduct cases, the analysis was comparatively simple.
Specifically, if the conduct was either severe or pervasive and the conduct was sexual
in nature, the courts presumed that the conduct was “because of sex” and found it
unlawful.56 If the conduct was not sexual in nature, however, the court needed to
delve into employer motivation. If the employer was motivated by sex (that is,
gender) the employee had a case for “gender harassment.”57 If gender was not the

55. Id. at 24–26.
56. In fact, as the law developed there were cases where the female employees were
considered to have suffered harassment if they were exposed to sexual conduct (e.g.,
conversations, pornographic pictures) that was not directed at them but was so pervasive that
the complaining employee could not escape. See, e.g., Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210 (2d
Cir. 2004).
57. See Cline v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Auto Lease, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 923, 931 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(holding that plaintiff stated a cause of action for gender discrimination after her supervisor
yelled at her; called her insulting names; hit, pinched, and pushed her; made a variety of rude
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motivation, there was no cause of action.58 Indeed, the “equal-opportunity jerk”
became the tongue-in-cheek explanation for finding that a supervisor who created a
hostile environment for employees regardless of sex (or any other protected class)
did not, paradoxically, violate sexual harassment law.
When Professor MacKinnon wrote that sexual harassment violated Title VII, she
was focusing exclusively on situations where supervising men harassed subordinate
women.59 The early line of cases, including Meritor, were located squarely within
that context. Post-Meritor, however, a relatively small number of cases involved
supervising women accused of harassing subordinate men. Uniformly, courts held
that these men also had a cause of action. In the mid-1990s, however, courts were
faced with an onslaught of “same-sex” sexual harassment cases (i.e., a man harassing
a man or a woman harassing a woman).
B. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment and the “Because of Sex” Problem
Between 1992 and 1997, four different appellate courts faced the question of
whether plaintiffs could make out a cause of action in same-sex cases. The four
circuits produced four different legal conclusions, prompting the Supreme Court to
address the issue in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc..60 Before
examining Oncale, a brief description of the four circuit court opinions that
motivated the Court’s Oncale decision is warranted.
The Fourth Circuit held that a same-sex sexual harassment claim would lie under
Title VII if the harasser was homosexual. In Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,
the plaintiff alleged that his supervisor graphically described homosexual sex acts to
Wrightson and pressured him to engage in sex.61 The supervisor also rubbed his
genital area against Wrightson’s buttocks and often groped him in the workplace.62
In finding for Wrightson, the Fourth Circuit held that same-sex Title VII claims were
actionable only when the alleged harasser is homosexual and therefore presumably
motivated by sexual desire.63
The Eighth Circuit held that a cause of action could proceed if an employer’s
conduct targeted an employee of one gender but not both genders. In Quick v.
Donaldson Co., the employees engaged in an activity they described as “bagging.”64
Bagging consisted of one employee hitting and grabbing another employee in the
crotch.65 The plaintiff alleged that at least twelve different male coworkers assaulted
him.66 Important to the Eighth Circuit, however, was that there was no evidence that

and boorish comments to her; and asked her offensive questions, when he did not act similarly
to male employees).
58. See id.
59. See MACKINNON, supra note 37, at 29.
60. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
61. 99 F.3d 138, 139 (4th Cir. 1996).
62. Id. at 140.
63. Id. at 143.
64. 90 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (8th Cir. 1996).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1374.
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any female employees were assaulted in such a manner.67 The Eighth Circuit found
for the plaintiff, reasoning plaintiffs may make out a claim for same-sex sexual
harassment so long as only one of the genders suffered the conduct alleged.68 If,
however, there was no disparate treatment (i.e., if both male and female employees
were treated similarly, even if poorly), then there was no cause of action.69
The Seventh Circuit held that there was a cause of action if an employee was
treated poorly for failing to live up to a particular sexual stereotype. In Doe v. City
of Belleville, two brothers, J. and H. Doe, alleged that they were physically
threatened and verbally harassed on a construction site.70 J. was called “fat boy” by
his coworkers because he was overweight.71 The employees, including a supervisor,
referred to the “effeminate” H. as “fag” or “queer” on a daily basis.72 The threats
soon escalated and became physical when a former marine grabbed H. by his testicles
and announced: “Well, I guess he is a guy.”73 Fearing even further escalation, the
brothers quit their jobs.74 The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the sexual
orientation of the harasser was determinative and instead focused on the conduct
endured by the plaintiffs. The court cited, seemingly with approval, cases holding
that conduct with sexual overtures is “because of sex” and thus, if severe and
pervasive, is unlawful.75
In contrast with the court’s language throughout the opinion, the circuit court’s
actual holding is comparatively narrower, owing in part to its reliance on (and
deference to) Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.76 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme
Court held that an employer violates Title VII when an employee is denied a term or
condition of employment because his or her appearance or conduct does not conform
to stereotypical gender roles.77 Similar to the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, the
Seventh Circuit concluded in Doe that H. was harassed because he did not conform
to his coworkers’ archaic stereotypical perceptions of “maleness.”78

67. Id. at 1376.
68. Id. at 1379.
69. Id.
70. 119 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 1997).
71. Id. at 567.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 576–77; see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d. 1469 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that while explicit sexual advances would constitute harassment, harassment
can exist without said advances if the conduct is discriminatory).
76. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
77. Id. at 250–51. Hopkins was a senior manager at Price Waterhouse, a professional
accounting partnership. After she was denied partnership, she sued Price Waterhouse,
charging that it had discriminated against her on the basis of sex. The Court ruled in Hopkins’s
favor, holding that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of
sex by when the firm applied different standards of behavior acceptable for men and women.
Specifically, the Court held that telling a woman to wear make-up, get her hair done, stop
cursing, and to act like women was discriminatory because the firm was applying sexual
stereotyping to women that it would never apply to a man. Id.
78. Doe, 119 F.3d at 580.
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Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that same-sex claims were never actionable
under Title VII. In Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, a male plaintiff alleged
that on several occasions his male supervisor approached him from behind, grabbed
him, and engaged in simulated sexual activity.79 Garcia complained to his employer
who informed the harassing supervisor that any further incidents would result in
termination.80 After the supervisor was reprimanded, no further incidents occurred
between Garcia and his supervisor.81 Shortly thereafter, Garcia filed a charge of
employment discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that he had been sexually
harassed in violation of Title VII.82 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s
summary judgment motion for four different reasons. First, the harm was not
repressible because the damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would
not retroactively apply to the conduct, and equitable relief would be moot because
Garcia still had his job.83 Second, the plaintiff failed to prove that any defendant was
his “employer” for Title VII purposes.84 Third, even if one of the defendants was his
employer for purposes of Title VII, the defendant took prompt remedial action
calculated to end the harassment and could thus avoid liability.85 Finally, the court
flatly stated, “harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate does not
state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has sexual overtones.”86
C. Oncale Defines the Law
Two years later the Fifth Circuit, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,87
once again faced a same-sex sexual harassment case. This time, the plaintiff’s case
did not feature the defects that hamstrung the plaintiff in Garcia. In Oncale, the
requested relief was available, the plaintiff named the proper employer, and the
employer did not respond to the complaints.88 Moreover, because the employer’s
conduct was severe or pervasive enough to withstand summary judgment,89 the court
was forced to reach the issue of whether same-sex sexual harassment would support
a claim under Title VII.90 Bound by its earlier decision in Garcia, the Fifth Circuit
dismissed the plaintiff’s case in Oncale.91 Despite dismissing the plaintiff’s case,

79. 28 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1994).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 448–49.
82. Id. at 449.
83. Id. at 450.
84. Id. at 450–51.
85. Id. at 451.
86. Id. at 451–52.
87. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
88. Id. at 118–19.
89. According to his lawyer, Nick Canady, Oncale’s coworkers, including supervisory
personnel, grabbed him, held him, unzipped their trousers and exposed themselves, and
threatened to have sex with him. Oncale claimed he was in a shower when these same men
got in the shower stall with him, restrained him, and sexually assaulted him using a bar of
soap.
90. Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120.
91. Id. at 120–21.
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however, the Fifth Circuit was troubled enough by its precedent to send up a judicial
flare:
This panel, however, cannot review the merits of Appellant’s Title VII
argument on a clean slate. We are bound by our decision in Garcia v. Elf
Atochem, and must therefore affirm the district court. Although our
analysis in Garcia has been rejected by various district courts, we cannot
overrule a prior panel’s decision. In this Circuit, one panel may not
overrule the decision, right or wrong, of a prior panel in the absence of
an intervening contrary or superseding decision by the Court en banc or
the Supreme Court.92
Oncale provided the U.S. Supreme Court an opportunity to resolve the circuit split
on the issue of same-sex harassment in the workplace. Confronted with an array of
legal approaches across various circuit courts, the Supreme Court faced three basic
choices: (1) judicially modify Title VII by holding that sexual conduct was per se
unlawful regardless of the sex of the parties; (2) conclude that Congress never
intended to prohibit such sexual harassment and that such conduct did not violate
Title VII; or (3) adhere to Title VII’s text which prohibits “discrimination”—with
“discrimination” itself understood as disparate treatment. While option two may
strike some as horrific at first blush, it would have plausibly prompted Congress to
immediately pass a new sexual harassment law. The Court, however, rejected the
first two options, as well as the holdings by the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits
and, instead focused Title VII’s “discrimination text” (i.e., disparate treatment) and
held that a same-sex plaintiff could make out a claim for sexual harassment as long
as the harassing conduct was “because of sex.”93 Importantly, the Court did not hold
that sexual conduct presumptively meets this element. Instead, the Court concluded
that the key issue is “whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed.”94 Thus, unlike what had been the generally accepted theory, the employee
had to prove that the harasser’s motivation for the conduct was the employee’s sex
regardless of how overtly sexual the conduct. This standard had previously applied
only to conduct of a non-sexual nature, but the Oncale decision meant that all sexual
harassment claims would need to pass this “motivation” test, even those where the
conduct was clearly of a sexual nature.
The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Oncale revealed both an
understandable adherence to the statute as well as an alarming lack of understanding
of the law of sexual harassment. Instead of attempting to use the same-sex
conundrum as a means for a meaningful analysis and a subsequent creation of logical
and effective standard for this non-legislative cause of action, the Court’s opinion
provides a solution in search of a problem. The mantra of the Oncale decision is to
seemingly ensure that sexual harassment law does not create a general code of
civility for the American workplace. As the Court wrote:

92. Id. at 119 (citation omitted).
93. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998).
94. Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)).
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The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither
asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so
objectively offensive as to alter the “conditions” of the victim’s
employment. ‘Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create
an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title
VII’s purview.’95
Fearing that a focus on an employer’s conduct would somehow alter the purpose of,
and theory behind, Title VII, the Court instead focused on the statute’s “because of
sex” requirement. In so doing, the Court made an employer’s motivation the key
element of a case and, without admitting as much, fundamentally changed sexual
harassment law.
After Oncale, the motivation behind employer conduct became vital as the
employee now had to establish that the employee’s gender motivated the harassment.
Oddly, the plaintiff bars immediately celebrated the Oncale decision as a key victory
for all workers, and specifically for homosexuals in the workplace. Indeed, the
American Civil Liberites Union (ACLU) hailed Oncale as an important holding “for
all Americans, gay or straight, male or female.”96 The ACLU and others who
celebrated Oncale in this manner, however, missed a key—admittedly subtle—point.
To be sure, while Oncale stayed true to Meritor and Title VII by articulating the
“because of sex” standard, at the same time the Court’s opinion fundamentally
altered how the requirement is operationalized. As stated above, courts in oppositesex harassment cases before Oncale presumed that conduct was “because of sex”
when the conduct was sexual in nature.97 In operationalizing the “because of sex”
requirement, the Oncale opinion, and subsequent lower court opinions, made clear
that the harasser’s motivation was critical to motivating the “because of sex”
element. Instead of simply proving that the conduct was (1) quid pro quo or (2)
severe or pervasive and sexual in nature—primarily objective inquiries—plaintiffs
after Oncale also had to establish the harasser’s subjective state of mind. Indeed, the
Court’s opinion provides three examples which would allow fact-finders to infer that
the harassers motivation was “because of sex”:
The same chain of inference would be available to a plaintiff alleging
same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser
was homosexual. But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual
desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A
trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a
female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by

95. Id. at 81 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).
96. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Sex Suit Fallout Alarms Its Advocates, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 2,
1999), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1999-08-02-9908020053-story.html
[https://perma.cc/RPS8-ZQJ4].
97. E.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that
“even if the motivation behind plaintiff’s mistreatment was gender neutral,” it could still form
a basis for a claim of sexual harassment because the conduct itself was “sexually harassing
behavior”); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he
harassment, because of its sexual nature, was based on [plaintiff’s] sex.”).
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another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by
general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace. A same-sex
harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes
in a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff
chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue
was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually
constituted “discrimination . . . because of . . . sex.” 98
It is difficult to overstate the importance of this change to Title VII. First, it
effectively ended a viable legal theory of sexual harassment in the workplace as
sexual conduct demeaning to women. Prior to Oncale, employer conduct that
sexually demeaned women and was severe or pervasive was considered sexual
harassment. For example, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., the court held
that a workplace plastered with pornographic pictures of women created a hostile
environment even though those posting the pictures had no intent to offend female
employees.99 Oncale’s focus on employer motivation means that cases like Robinson
can no longer be considered unlawful harassment. Instead, if the motivation behind
the conduct is not to demean either sex, the conduct, regardless of its severity,
pervasiveness, or result, does not itself constitute sexual harassment.
For example, in Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc.,100 the plaintiff testified,
and the court accepted, that some of the primarily male staff engaged in open
conversations about sex, made comments about the sexual habits of others on the
staff, used foul and profane language, told sexually oriented jokes, and pretended to
perform oral sex and other sexual acts on a mannequin.101 In addition, “the shop
supervisor showed a photograph of a nude woman around the shop and engaged in
several sexually explicit conversations with Ocheltree's male coworkers.”102 In
dismissing the case, the court held that while the conduct was disgusting and vulgar,
it was not directed at Ocheltree because she was a woman and that, in any event, she
would have been exposed to the conduct even if she were a man.103 Thus, after
Ocheltree and Oncale, sexually explicit discussions between two men or displayed
pornography that was not directed only at women would not be unlawful if the
conduct was not motivated by the plaintiff’s sex. Moreover, the all-male workplace
where the men displayed pornography and routinely discussed sexual acts would not
be unlawful when women entered the job site because the conduct could not have
been motivated by the plaintiffs’ sex.104 Such judicial outcomes conflict with original

98. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81. The tone deafness of that paragraph is incredible
by today’s standards. A woman, according to Justice Scalia, might have “general
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.” Id. at 80. Of course, men
would never feel that way about other men.
99. 760 F. Supp 1486, 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
100. 308 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2002)
101. Id. at 359–60.
102. Id. at 364.
103. Id. at 358–59.
104. Id. at 357.
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sexual harassment jurisprudence, run up against the weight of academic
commentary,105 and, of course, likely offend many.
Second, to make matters worse, the “because of sex” requirement creates
situations, similar to those found in Oncale and Doe, where threats of, and even
actual, sexual assaults are not necessarily unlawful sexual harassment. That is, how
could Oncale, a male working on an all-male oil rig, prove that he was sodomized
with a bar of soap because he was a man? As it is a functionally impossible
evidentiary burden to meet, Oncale’s employer would likely confront no meaningful
prospect of sexual harassment liability.106 Finally, the Court’s logic in Oncale created
a new defense for employers: the equal opportunity harasser.
D. Equal Opportunity Harasser Defense
In Holman v. Indiana, a husband and wife alleged that the same supervisor
sexually harassed them.107 The wife alleged that the male supervisor sexually
harassed her by touching her body, standing too close to her, asking her to go to bed
with him, making sexual comments, and otherwise creating a hostile work
environment based on her sex.108 In addition, owing to her refusal to perform sex
acts requested by her supervisor, the supervisor negatively altered Mrs. Holman’s
job-performance evaluations and otherwise retaliated against her for protesting his
harassing behavior.109 The Holmans’ complaint further alleged that the supervisor
harassed the husband by “grabbing his head while asking for sexual favors.”110 When
the husband refused such requests, the supervisor retaliated by opening the husband’s
locker and throwing away his belongings.111
Predictably, the couple’s sexual harassment complaint set forth all the relevant
facts with regard to the humiliating “sexual in nature” conduct to which both Mr. and
Mrs. Holman were subjected.112 The employer responded by focusing on the fact that
since the supervisor harassed and demanded sex from both a man and woman, the
conduct could not be “because of sex.”113 The court dismissed the case based on the
equal opportunity harasser defense. To support its decision, the court stated that “the
equal opportunity harasser does not treat plaintiffs differently than members of the
opposite sex . . . [and] under current sex-discrimination theories, there is no
discrimination when something happens to both sexes and not simply to one.”114 The
court concluded by stating: “Simply put, the court concludes that, under current Title

105. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 37; Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
106. Of course, the perpetrators could be arrested and sued in tort, but they likely would
not have the money to make such a case viable.
107. 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 911 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 911.
113. Id. at 912.
114. Id. at 912.

986

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:969

VII jurisprudence, conduct occurring equally to members of both genders cannot be
discrimination ‘because of sex’” and is therefore not unlawful.115
In Romero v. Caribbean Restaurants, Inc., the court likewise dismissed the
plaintiff’s sexual harassment case because the supervisor imposed the same
harassing conduct upon men and women.116 Landrau, the plaintiff, alleged his
supervisor made an explicitly sexual comment to him. The supervisor then repeated
the comment to a female employee shortly thereafter.117 Similar to Holman, the
Romero court dismissed the case pursuant to the equal opportunity harasser
defense.118 To support its decision, the court stated, “[T]he record clearly shows that
Figueroa [the supervisor] did not reserve his tasteless comportment for male
employees, or that he treated male employees differently from female employees. In
fact, it appears that Figueroa directed his most outlandish behavior, grabbing his
genitals, as an insult to female employees.”119 The court concluded: “While
Figueroa’s behavior and comments were often sexual in nature, and may have
created an undignified or even unpleasant working environment, they were not
discriminatory and thus not actionable under Title VII.”120 In fact, according to both
Holman and Romero, the equal-opportunity-harasser defense defeats both quid pro
quo and hostile environment cases.121
By orientating the “because of sex” element to pivot on a harasser’s
motivation, the Oncale decision inadvertently created a safe haven for objectionable
conduct that strikes many as odious. One paradigmatic fact pattern often presented
to the EEOC and state agencies is the “consensual affair gone sour” (CAGS). Prior
to Oncale, the law of CAGS was clear: a party to a consensual affair was not a
member of a protected class, and thus a supervisor could terminate or harass an exlover—as long as the conduct was not sexual in nature.122 In other words, the
supervisor could demote, terminate, and demean the ex, but could not demand that
the ex-lover resume the affair or engage in sexually charged conduct.123 The putative
logic is that such a supervisor is not acting because the employee is a man or a
woman. Instead, it is because she is that man or woman. If the conduct was sexual
in nature or constituted a quid pro quo, however, that was per se unlawful, and the
“that woman” argument would provide no defense because such conduct was
unlawful regardless of motivation.
Post-Oncale, however, the “that woman” argument works for all conduct—
nonsexual conduct, conduct of a sexual nature, and even quid pro quo. One can see
the logic, for example, in arguing: “I did not make suggestive statements because she
was a woman, it was because she was the person who, for example, broke my heart,
broke my friend’s heart, beat me out for class valedictorian … and I want her to

115. Id. at 916.
116. 14 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D.P.R. 1998).
117. Id. at 187.
118. Id. at 190.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 912, 913 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Romero, 14 F.
Supp. 2d at 189, 192.
122. Holman, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 912; Romero, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
123. See, e.g., Huebschen v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 1167 (1983).
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quit.” Such logic, however, begs a critical question: Does the motivation of the
perpetrator of a sexual assault, a quid pro quo demand, or the pervasive sexually
based demeaning comments and actions matter to a victim?
E. Liability: The Run- Up to Ellerth/Faragher
As #MeToo-motivated issues swarmed cable news networks, many
commentators invested substantial amounts of time discussing company reactions to
sexual harassment claims by focusing on NDAs and the true motivations of human
resource departments.124 The driving motivational force behind employers’
reactions—employer liability—is, of course, too nuanced and, arguably, complex for
the soundbites that festoon much of current popular discourse. Indeed, some states
and a number of scholars have legislated or argued that employers are, or should be,
strictly liable for sexual harassment.125 The relevant legal terrain and doctrine,
however, are far more nuanced, granular, and, too often, unclear as the lower courts’
efforts to operationalize Oncale (and other Court decisions in this space) illustrate.
Below we provide a brief history of employer liability law and present empirical
analyses on how courts operationalize the Court’s vicarious liability standards.
The Meritor Court instructed the lower courts to determine liability by looking to
“agency principles.”126 With no statute and little guidance, this was another recipe
for confusion and perverse incentives. By 1998 there was some degree of both
agreement and disagreement across the circuits when it came to employer liability.
The circuits agreed, for example, that employers were always liable for quid pro quo
harassment, but could avoid liability for hostile environment cases.127 The theory
behind this distinction was that in quid pro quo cases, the supervisor truly acted as
an agent in the company because the threatened actions (e.g., hiring, firing,
promoting, demoting, etc.) were company actions that could only be accomplished

124. Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-tochange [https://perma.cc/DJ4P-GZMN]; Monica Torres, What Exactly Is An NDA? Here's
What Workers Need To Know Before They Sign, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2020, 6:14 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-is-an-nda-nondisclosure-agreement_l_5e4ea360c5b6a
-7bfb4c21e7b [https://perma.cc/7LHZ-S27M].
125. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(j)(1) (West 2021) (stating that an employer is
strictly liable for acts of harassment committed by an agent or supervisor); David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual
Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66 (1995); Floeting v. Grp.
Health Coop., 434 P.3d 39, 44 (Wash. 2019) (adopting the strict liability test for employers in
sexual harassment cases); Sangamon County Sheriff's Dep't v. Ill. Human Rights Comm'n,
233 Ill. 2d 125 (2009); Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 14 N.Y.3d 469 (2009).
126. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70–72 (1986).
127. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that to prevail on a hostile work environment harassment claim, the employee must prove,
inter alia, that some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer); see also Ellert v. Univ.
of Tex. at Dall., 52 F.3d 543, 545 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining respondeat superior as part of
quid pro quo claims); Pfau v. Reed, 125 F.3d 927, 936–37 (5th Cir. 1997); Jansen v. Packaging
Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997); Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365,
1367–68 (8th Cir. 1997).
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in the course of employment with the express or implied consent of the employer.128
Alternatively, a hostile environment could be created without any use of “company
power.”129 The supervisor could make comments or touch employees without
engaging in an official company action.130 This is why circuits agreed that employers
were liable for quid pro quo but not always for hostile environment.131
With regard to hostile environment, however, circuit courts split over two
competing theories. A minority of circuits applied the quid pro quo reasoning and
held that if the supervisor used agency power to create the hostile environment, then
the company was liable.132 As an example, a company would be liable for the actions
of a supervisor who used the power of the job to call a daily meeting with a
subordinate and during the meeting commented on the employee’s body, touched the
employee, or required the employee to watch pornography. A majority of circuits,
however, employed the so-called negligence standard.133 Under the negligence
standard, the employer was liable if it knew or should have known about the
harassment. Thus, in the example above, the employer would not be liable if it had a
policy against sexual harassment informing the employees to complain and the
employee did not.134
As to be expected, plaintiffs’ lawyers had a huge incentive to have their cases
labeled as quid pro quo as opposed to hostile environment. The fact that the labels
were both unclear, elastic, and not mutually exclusive helped fuel substantial
litigation. The differences between the theories are substantial at the extreme but not
at the margins. For example, a supervisor who tells an employee, “sleep with me or
you are fired,” and then fires the employee who does not acquiesce has clearly
engaged in quid pro quo harassment. However, the issue is not so clear when, for
example: (1) the employee refuses to sleep with the supervisor and does not get fired;
(2) the employee sleeps with the supervisor and does not get fired; (3) the employee
quits and the supervisor now claims it was a joke; or (4) the threat is not as clear
(e.g., “things would go better for you here if you wore more provocative clothes and
were a little more accommodating”), and the employee quits, acquiesces, or ignores
the supervisor but is not disciplined. Are any or all of the scenarios listed above quid
pro quo? Are any or all of the scenarios a hostile environment? There are cases where
each of these scenarios has been labeled quid pro quo, hostile environment, both, and
neither.135

128. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777–81 (2d Cir. 1994).
129. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 777–81.
130. Id. at 780 (explaining that an employer is liable for a discriminatorily abusive work
environment created by a supervisor if the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to
further the harassment, in contrast to the situation where a low-level supervisor does not rely
on his supervisory authority to carry out the harassment).
131. See supra note 127.
132. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780.
133. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1368 (8th Cir. 1997); see also
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 498 (7th Cir. 1997).
134. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 498.
135. See, e.g., Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1989)
(responding to allegations of, among other things, touching and attempting to kiss an
employee, and then giving her a bad review and then transferring her, the court stated, “Hostile
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In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth136 the question before the Court was:
Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under
Title VII . . . where the plaintiff employee has neither submitted to the
sexual advances of the alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects
on the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment as
a consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?137
The Court addressed the quid pro quo-hostile environment distinction, but not in the
way the parties intended. First, the Court defined quid pro quo when it concluded:
“Cases based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo
cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.”138 Arguably, then, the
Court’s view was that quid pro quo harassment requires that a threat must be carried
out. If a threat were carried out, employees who acquiesced or were not disciplined
for rejecting the advances could not make out a case of quid pro quo harassment.
Thus, all cases with threats but no discipline would be hostile environment cases.
After acknowledging the quid pro quo-hostile environment distinction, the Court
rejected the theory that this distinction determined employer liability.139 The Court
instead held that the key issue was whether the employee suffered a tangible loss.140
If yes, the employer was liable;141 if no, the employer was liable but could escape
liability if it could prove an affirmative defense.142 If the Court’s statement, “Cases
based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases,”143
accurately defines quid pro quo, then all quid pro quo cases result in strict vicarious
liability for employers. In addition, employers would face the specter of liability even

environment and quid pro quo harassment causes of action are not always clearly distinct and
separate. The discrimination which gives rise to them is not neatly compartmentalized but, as
this case demonstrates, the two types of claims may be complementary to one
another.”); Giordano v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 804 F. Supp. 637, 640–44 (D. N.J.
1992) (denying motion for summary judgment on quid pro quo but granting motion on hostile
environment when employment was conditioned on acquiescing to sexual demands but
harassing conduct stopped after complaints); Simmons v. Miami Valley Trotting, Inc., No.
1:04-CV-478, 2006 WL 1000076, at *3, *7–8 (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 14, 2006) (holding that
requests for sexual favors, inappropriate touching, and groping hostile environment are not
quid pro quo); Misas v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., No. 14-CV-08787, 2017
WL 1535112, at *3–7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2017) (finding a hostile environment and not quid
pro quo despite the employee being fired for complaining about the harassing conduct).
136. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
137. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Burlington, 524 U.S. 742 (No. 97-569) (emphasis
in original) (citation omitted); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)
(expanding on Ellerth in a situation where the employer failed to satisfy the defense because
its policy was not disseminated).
138. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751.
139. Id. at 753–54.
140. Id. at 764–65.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 765.
143. Id. at 751.
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when employees were not threatened but still suffered tangible losses arising out of
hostile environment. Thus, only hostile environment employees who did not suffer
a tangible loss were subject to an affirmative defense.
The so-called Ellerth/Faragher employer defense consists of two prongs: (1)
“that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior,” and (2) “that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”144 Upon any fair reading of this language,
employers cannot avoid liability simply by proving that they acted reasonably, or
even with the utmost care.145 They must also prove that the employee was
unreasonable in some way. A fortiori, if an employee behaves properly—that is, they
report the harassment and accept the employer’s reasonable corrective action—the
employer should never be able to establish prong two and will always be vicariously
liable.146
F. Empirical Analyses of the Ellerth/Faragher Defense
Commentators’ reactions to Ellerth and Faragher were swift and strong: many
hypothesized that employers would never be awarded summary judgment because
(1) whether an employer exercised reasonable care in prong one would be a jury
question regardless of whether or not the employee reported, (2) whether an
employee was “unreasonable” in prong two would be a jury question if the employee
failed to report, and (3) the employer could not prevail if the employee reported.147
To assess the efficacy of these reactions, we consider how employees’ affirmative
defenses fared at the summary judgment level. Of particular interest is how courts
construe the core reasonableness requirements embedded within the affirmative
defense. What we find, once again, is that many conventional wisdoms are not borne
out by data.148
Findings from our earlier analyses of summary judgment decisions between 1998
and 2000 first revealed that employers satisfied the first prong in forty-two of the
seventy-two cases.149 Second, employers prevailed in every one of the twenty cases
where they satisfied prong one and the employee did not report the harassment.150
Third, employers prevailed in eighteen of the twenty-two cases where the employer
satisfied the first prong and the employee did report.151 Thus, instead of summary
judgment motions becoming a relic of legal history, employers prevailed in thirty-

144. Id.
145. See, id. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and
Cancel Your 1-800 Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the
Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265,
1288–89 (2001).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1284.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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eight of their seventy-two summary judgment motions in our sample.152 Our prior
study also identified two notable factors: First, contrary to conventional wisdom,
employers only needed to have a “good” or “credible” policy153 to satisfy prong
one.154 In fact, only one court held that employers might need to have something
more (e.g., training, a 1-800 hotline number, etc.).155 Second, even though Justice
Thomas’s dissent in Ellerth correctly contends that a technical reading of the defense
would result in the employer failing to prevail under the affirmative defense if the
employee reported, employers prevailed in eighteen of the twenty-two cases where
the employer satisfied the first prong and the employee reported.156 These outcomes
imply that courts were reluctant to penalize employers who did “everything right.”157
Our current study both revisits and extends our earlier study of summary
judgment outcomes in the workplace discrimination context. Similar to our prior
effort, our new data set includes all published judicial opinions between 2010 and
2018 for cases involving alleged sexual harassment in the workplace where an
employer asserted an affirmative defense and advanced a motion for summary
judgment (N=157). A summary judgment motion permits a court to grant a judgment
as a matter of law to a party that can establish that its opponent cannot prevail at
trial.158 When a court weighs an employer’s motion for summary judgment, it
considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the employee, the nonmoving
party.159 Thus, by their very nature, motions for summary judgment tilt heavily in a
direction favoring the employee.160 Because we include all known published
opinions within this time period, our study sidesteps many (but not all) technical
sampling issues.161
Before discussing results from our new study, however, we want to (re)empathize
a few cautionary points. Empirical legal studies inevitably confront various structural
research design limitations that limit, in sometimes important ways, results’

152. Id. at 1288.
153. We defined a good or credible employer policy as one that was written, disseminated,
and did not force the employee to report to the harassing supervisor, instead having
“alternative channels.” Id. at 1278.
154. Id. at 1282–84.
155. Id. at 1290.
156. Id. at 1292.
157. Id. at 1294.
158. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986) (noting that courts must draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party).
159. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
160. For a fuller discussion of the application of summary judgments in the hostile
workplace environment cases, see Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in
Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 86–97 (1999).
161. That is to say, because our study uses the entire universe of known published cases,
our sample is not exposed to standard questions concerning sample selection bias. See, e.g.,
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1409 n.147 (1998);
see also MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 262 (1990).
Insofar as not all judicial summary judgment rulings are published, however, our sample
remains exposed to a potential threat posed by so-called “publication bias.” See, e.g., Edward
K. Cheng, Detection and Correction of Case-Publication Bias, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (2018).
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generalizability, and our studies of summary judgment outcomes are not immune
from these limitations. One such limitation involves selection bias.162 The decisions
in our studies, drawn from conventional sources of published judicial decisions (e.g.,
LEXIS and Westlaw), are not a random sample of all employment-related disputes
as those culminating in published judicial decisions represent only a small fraction
of cases where motions are decided and judicial outcomes emerge.163 Thus, we are
not certain if our results can be generalized to the broader universe of nonpublished
judicial decisions or, frankly, to the much broader universe of employee disputes that
do not initiate or culminate in formal legal proceedings.
Another limitation involves missing data. We sought data on an array of variables,
including, but not limited to: (1) employer win rate, (2) employer satisfaction of
prong one, (3) the type of preventative measures employers engaged in, (4) the type
of reactions to complaints the employer engaged in, (5) employer satisfaction of
prong two, (6) whether the complaining employee reported, (7) if the employee’s
report was timely, and (8) the types of conduct alleged. Unsurprisingly, not every
judicial opinion addressed each of our variables and therefore we have to suffer with
some missing data.
Similar to our initial effort in 2001, our latest study sets out to analyze every
summary judgment motion based on the Ellerth/Faragher defense from 2010 to
2018 publicly available in the standard legal reporters. Because we self-consciously
sought to “update” our earlier work, we also facilitate, where possible, comparisons
across time and consider: (1) what employers needed to do to satisfy prong one (e.g.,
training, 1-800 numbers, etc.); (2) the effect of the type of response on prong one;
(3) the failure-to-report effect on prong two; (4) the influence of an employee’s
timeliness on prong two; (5) the effect of the type of conduct on the win/loss record;
and (6) the overall win/loss record. To “expand” upon and “update” our prior work,
we also explore one key additional new variable: (7) the possible effect of the
emerging #MeToo context on the employers’ overall win/loss record.
Overall, employers prevailed in 68 out of 157 cases (or 43% win rate). In eighty
cases (51% of the total) the employer was found to satisfy prong one, and in all but
twelve of those cases, the employer also satisfied prong two. Thus, conditional on
successfully satisfying prong one, employers’ win rate increased from 51% to 85%
of cases.
1. Prong One
We examine whether there is any relationship between the employer’s policies
related to sexual harassment and the outcome of prong one. In 141 cases we have
sufficient information to determine whether the employer had a good policy;164 for
smaller subsets of cases, we know whether the employer offered training (88 cases)
or had a 1-800 number (71 cases). Among the cases where this information is known,

162. See, e.g., Sisk et al., supra note 161, at 1409 n.147; see also FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN,
supra note 161, at 262.
163. See Cheng, supra note 161, at 152.
164. A “good” policy is written, disseminated, and has alternate channels of reporting from
only the supervisor. Sherwyn et al., supra note 147.
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82% of employers had a good policy, 63% offered training, and 42% had a 1-800
number.
As expected, employers that implement a good policy, offer employee training,
and operate a 1-800 number increased their probability of satisfying prong one.
Employers that had a good policy,165 for example, satisfied the first prong 63% of
the time. In contrast, in the twenty-five cases where the employer did not have a good
policy, prong one was never satisfied. Those employers that offered training satisfied
the first prong in 69% of cases, compared to 24% for those without training. And
employers with a 1-800 number satisfied the first prong in 73% of the cases,
compared to 42% for those without a 1-800 number.
For most of our cases, we have information on the employer’s response to the
alleged workplace discrimination, including whether the court found the employer’s
response credible and whether the alleged harasser was disciplined, trained, or fired
by the employer.166 Employer responses were found credible in 48% of the cases.
The alleged harasser was disciplined in 37% of cases, trained in 26% of cases, and
fired in 24% of cases. While all of these employer responses correspond with a higher
probability of an employer satisfying prong one, formal statistical significance at the
traditional threshold was achieved for only two specific employer responses
(employer credible response and employee disciplined).
While our descriptive results, briefly summarized above, imply helpful insights
into how various factors may inform the probability that an employer will satisfy
prong one, we now turn to whether some of these descriptive findings survive
regression models that simultaneously account for more than one factor. Insofar as
our data set is dominated by federal district court decisions, we clustered at the circuit
level owing to uncertainty about the independence of district court outcomes within
a circuit.167 In general, results in Table 1 emphasize overall stability and robustness
across the various alternative specifications as well as the persistent influence of an
employer having a good sexual harassment policy and the credibility of the
employer’s response on the likelihood that an employer will satisfy prong one. Also
notable in Table 1, Model D (and discussed further below), is that employees who
reported in a timely manner systematically reduced the likelihood of an employer
satisfying prong one.

165. Meaning that the court deemed the policy acceptable.
166. This information is not available for all cases. We know whether the response was
credible for 127 cases, whether the employee was disciplined for 129 cases, whether the
employee was trained for 113 cases, and whether the employee was fired for 124 cases.
167. In our various models, standard errors were adjusted for fourteen clusters. While we
feel clustering on judicial circuits is warranted in this context, as a robustness check in
unreported alternative analyses, we reran our models without clustering and no material
substantive changes in our results emerged.

994

[Vol. 96:969

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

Table 1: Logistic Regression Models of Employer Satisfying Prong One
(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

4.08**
(1.04)
0.99
(0.75)
1.28
(0.51)
5.63**
(1.04)

4.13**
(1.33)
1.23
(0.65)
0.91
(0.69)
5.26**
(1.22)

4.12**
(1.03)
1.07
(0.90)
1.43**
(0.54)
5.57**
(1.05)

4.26**
(1.17)
1.22
(1.24)
0.48
(1.02)
4.85**
(1.15)

Employee disciplined

---

---

---

Employee trained

---

---

---

Employee fired

---

---

---

Employee failed to report

---

1.42
(0.84)
-0.26
(0.86)
-1.40
(0.86)
---

---

Employee’s report timely

---

---

0.14
(0.91)
---

I Employer factors:
Good employer policy
Employer training
Employer 1-800 number
Employer’s response credible

I Employee factors:

I

I

-2.41*
(1.10)
Constant
-6.26** -6.14** -6.30** -4.85**
(1.10)
(1.34)
(1.17)
(1.09)
R2 (pseudo)
0.68
0.69
0.67
0.75
Log likelihood
-28.71
-19.57
-27.66
-14.31
N
129
91
123
84
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered on circuit, in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p <
0.01. The models were estimated using the “logit” command in Stata (v.16.1).
2. Prong Two
We also consider how an employee’s reporting of a complaint affects an
employer’s probability of satisfying prong two. Among the 146 cases where
reporting status is clear, the employee reported in 79% of cases, including in 75% of
the cases where the first prong was satisfied. Conditional on satisfying prong one,
employers were more likely to win in cases where the employee did not report at all
about the alleged conduct. Among the eighty cases where the first prong was
satisfied, there were twenty cases where the employee did not report and sixty cases
where the employee did. Of the twenty cases where the employee did not report, the
employer satisfied prong two in nineteen of them (95%). Of the sixty cases where
the employee reported, the employer satisfied prong two in forty-nine of them (82%).
These results generally comport with the findings from our 2001 study.
Aside from whether an employee reported at all, a determination of the
“timeliness” of the employee report appears to play an important role as well. When
we examine cases where the employee reported and the employer prevailed, the
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employee’s report was deemed untimely 91% of the time.168 Conditional on
satisfying prong one and the employee reporting, the determination of timeliness of
the employee’s report systematically corresponds with prong two’s outcome.
Overall, our sample includes fifty-five cases where information on the timeliness of
an employee’s report is known. In ten of these cases, the employee’s report was ruled
timely, and the employer satisfied prong two in only four of them (40%). In fortyfive cases, the employee’s report was ruled not timely, and by contrast, the employer
satisfied prong two in forty-one of them (91%).
Table 2 presents results from selection models assessing the probability of an
employer satisfying prong two (conditioned on the employer satisfying prong one).
Similar to what the descriptive results hint at, and as the results in Model B illustrate,
employees who reported in a timely manner systematically reduced the probability
that the employer would satisfy prong two. While an employee’s failure to report at
all did not achieve statistical significance in Table 1 Model C (above), that it achieves
significance in our selection models (Table 2 Model A) implies that the subpool of
cases where an employer satisfies prong one systematically differs from the subpool
of cases where the employer fails to satisfy prong one.169 Consequently, and
conditional on an employer satisfying prong one, an employee who failed to report
a workplace sexual harassment complaint to the employer at all systematically
increased the probability of the employer satisfying prong two.
Table 2: Selection Models of Employer Satisfying Prong Two
(Conditioned on Employer Satisfying Prong One)
Employer Satisfies Prong Two:
Employee failed to report
Employee’s report timely
Constant
Employer Satisfies Prong One:
Good employer policy
Employer training
Employer 1-800 number
Employer’s response credible
Constant

(A)

(B)

5.73**
(0.24)
---

---

1.02**
(0.20)

-1.63**
(0.36)
1.44**
(0.24)

2.07**
(0.47)
0.39
(0.37)
0.72**
(0.25)
3.08**
(0.44)
-3.28**
(0.54)

2.10**
(0.57)
0.49
(0.39)
0.15
(0.39)
3.35**
(0.50)
-3.63**
(0.65)

168. There are forty-five cases where the employee reported, the employer won, and the
timeliness is known. In forty-one of the forty-five cases, the report was ruled not timely.
169. Further support for our use of selection models is provided by results for the Rho test
statistic reported in Table 2.
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Log likelihood
-54.25
-37.33
Rho
4.13*
4.20*
N
129
112
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered on circuit, in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p
< 0.01. The models were estimated using the “heckprobit” command in Stata
(v.16.1).
3. Employer Success Rate at Summary Judgment
We do not find a strong relationship between the outcome of an employer’s
summary judgment motion and the type (or types) of conduct the employee
complained of. We categorize the type of conduct in four (non-mutually-exclusive)
ways: sexual conduct, sexual comment, sexual touching, and sexual assault.170 Most
cases in our sample involved sexual conduct (94%) or sexual comments (93%); 87
of 152 cases involved sexual touching (57%) and 26 of those involved sexual assault
(17% of the total). Employer win rates are lower for cases involving sexual touching
or sexual assault, but these differences do not achieve statistical significance.171
As noted above, over the full nine-year period of our study, employers prevailed
in 43% of cases. When we isolate at the most recent cases, we do not detect any
significant effect attributable to the influence of the #MeToo movement on the
employer’s overall win rate. Insofar as only twenty cases in the sample were decided
after the emergence of the #MeToo movement, the statistical power available to
detect any such influence is low. Overall, the employer win rate is slightly lower for
2018 than for 2010–2017: the employer prevailed in 35% of the cases (seven out of
twenty) decided in 2018, compared to 45% for 2010–2017. Thus, to the extent that
the #MeToo movement may systematically increase the likelihood of employer
liability, it is likely that not enough time has passed to statistically detect any such
potential influence.
To better isolate the potential independent influence of the various types of odious
workplace conduct on an employer’s prospects for prevailing at summary judgment,
after controlling for various employer and employee factors, Table 3 presents results
from our model. Consistent with what we find descriptively, none of the various
types of conduct systematically vary with the summary judgment’s outcome.

170. There are some missing values, but this information is available for most cases. Two
cases (out of 157) are missing information for sexual conduct, and there are three missing
values each for sexual comments, sexual touching, and sexual assault.
171. We did find a lower employer win rate for cases involving sexual comments than
those that did not. This difference was statistically significant, but there were only eleven cases
that did not involve sexual comments.
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Model of Employer Prevailing at Summary Judgment
Employer factors:
Good employer policy
Employer training
Employer 1-800 number
Employer’s response credible
Employee factor:
Employee failed to report
Nature of complaint:
Conduct

(A)
3.26*
(1.30)
-0.24
(0.98)
1.02
(0.76)
3.88**
(0.54)
0.96
(1.12)

0.55
(0.62)
Comment
-2.29
(1.20)
Touching
0.89
(0.81)
Assault
0.14
(0.91)
Atmosphere
-0.82
(0.87)
Constant
-4.15**
(1.56)
R2 (pseudo)
0.53
Log likelihood
-33.86
N
104
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered on circuit, in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p
< 0.01. The model was estimated using the “logit” command in Stata (v.16.1).
As noted above, Justice Thomas’ dissent in Ellerth warned that employers will
never prevail when an employee reports sexual harassment in the workplace to their
employer.172 Our study, in contrast, finds that employers prevailed in their motions
for summary judgment in 82% of the cases where the employer satisfied prong one
of the Ellerth/Faragher defense and the employee reported the sexual harassment.
We conclude that judges remain disinclined to find against employers who “do the
right thing.” As stated above, one way for courts to justify such holdings is to
construe the employee’s response as “unreasonable” by focusing on employee
reporting timeliness. Indeed, what we find is that in the vast majority of the reported
cases where the employer prevailed, the courts found the employee’s report to be
untimely. Thus, courts appear to be functionally imposing a very short statute of
limitations on sexual harassment cases. This statute of limitations is dependent,

172. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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however, on the employer’s prevention and response efforts. A deeper dive into the
cases suggests that the definition of timeliness ranges substantially from case to
case.173 In fact, we found cases where employees who waited two weeks to report
were deemed untimely and, thus, unreasonable.
III. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT PROTECTIONS IMPLEMENTED TO PROTECT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT VICTIMS
A. Current Climate
The #MeToo movement positively changed the national discourse on sexual
harassment. As stated above, instead of being just another “cause of action under title
VII, sexual harassment is now correctly regarded as a national epidemic.174 Two of
the main protections recently implemented are the tax code penalties for NDAs and
the effort to eliminate predispute mandatory employment arbitration. A discussion
of the latter would entail a full analysis of the arguments for and against arbitration
and is thus beyond the scope of this Article. We do, however, address the limitations
on NDAs for the purpose of showing that the unintended consequences of what
seems like a relatively simple and cost-free “fix” could result in a standard that
perpetuates and exacerbates the conduct it sought to prevent.
B. Privacy and Non-Disclosure Agreements
In the aftermath of the #MeToo movement, employee advocates identified NDAs
and other attempts to keep allegations and settlements private as negatives for both
employees and society.175 The theory behind such a push for greater transparency is
that allowing employees to air their experiences and shame employers engaged in

173. Compare Finnegan v. Washoe County, No. 3:17-cv-00002-MMD-WGC, 2017 WL
3299040, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 2, 2017) (holding that when the harassment began in 2010 and
plaintiff did not report until 2015, the report was untimely), with Benson v. Solvay Specialty
Polymers USA, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-04638-CAP-RGV, 2018 WL 5118615, at *18–19 (N.D.
Ga. July 3, 2018) (holding that although plaintiff complained numerous times and frequently,
it was unreasonable for plaintiff to think anything would come of the complaints after the
company took no remedial action, and therefore plaintiff should have taken her complaints
another route).
174. See Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced
Sexual Harassment, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Feb. 21, 2018, 7:43 PM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-womenhave-experienced-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/UHT5-BCHY]; Jillian Berman,
Sexual Harassment is Learned Long Before the Perpetrators Enter the Workforce,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 2, 2017, 6:33 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/collegeshave-a-role-to-play-in-curbing-workplace-harassment-epidemic-2017-11-09 [https://perma
.cc/8SWV-VR9S]; see generally Jennifer Rubin, The Sexual Assault Epidemic is Real, WASH.
POST (Dec. 7, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017
/12/07/the-sexual-assault-epidemic-is-real/ [https://perma.cc/2CR4-M8DB].
175. See generally Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the
Culture of Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and
Secret Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507 (2018).
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actionable conduct creates an additional deterrent to future harassment. The law
seemingly supports this theory because under the Internal Revenue Code, after 2018,
employers can no longer deduct legal fees and settlements if the resolution includes
an NDA.176 The anti-NDA theory seemingly gained momentum when Mayor
Michael Bloomberg’s bid for the 2020 Democratic nomination for President was
derailed, in part, by the two debates where Senator Elizabeth Warren made the case
that NDAs are a net negative for society as she insisted that Mayor Bloomberg
release all of his former employees from NDAs that they signed. Based on the law,
Senator Warren’s NDA questions, and the public’s reaction, one should infer that
NDAs are one-sided agreements that only benefit the employer and provide nothing
of value for the employee or anyone else. We contest that narrative and contend that
NDAs can benefit the employer, the employee, the accused, and society.
Employers settle cases with an NDA for a number of reasons including, but not
limited to: (1) the employer or its supervisor violated the law, and the employer
wishes to avoid publicity for actions that did occur; and (2) neither the employer nor
the supervisor violated the law, and the employer wants to avoid publicity, avoid the
cost of defense (including fees and time), and protect or placate a falsely accused
supervisor who demands vindication.177
We contend that many (but, to be sure, not all) sexual harassment victims want
their claims to be resolved quickly and privately so that they can get on with their
lives because, except in a few cities and states, the prospect for lucrative damage
awards is remote, and even prevailing plaintiffs typically need (or want) to secure
new employment.178 An NDA promotes most employees’ desired outcomes by
incentivizing employers to settle and by making it possible for claimants to get new
jobs.
An NDA allows a claimant to find a new job. There is no dispute among people
knowledgeable about the hiring process that employers perform various levels of
background checks on some job applicants. Indeed, the Ellerth/Faragher defense
requires as much by requiring that employers exercise reasonable care to prevent
sexual harassment.179 For example, an employer who failed to conduct a background
check before hiring a supervisor who had been found to have sexually harassed an
employee would certainly fail to satisfy the first prong of the defense. Moreover, an
employer who hired an employee who posed an unreasonable risk to the public (e.g.,
hiring a convicted pedophile to work with children) would be guilty of negligent
hiring and/or negligent retention. It simply cannot be argued that employers do not
perform extensive background checks. Since litigation is public, employers can
easily discover if an applicant has brought an action against an applicant’s former

176. I.R.C. § 162 (2018). Many states have also adopted laws the prohibit NDAs in sexual
harassment contexts. E.g., S.B. 121, 2018 Sess., 218th Sess. (N.J. 2019); S.B. 820, 2017–2018
Sess. (Cal. 2018); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (2020); H.B. 2020, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(A.Z. 2018).
177. The author bases this assertion on his 5 years of full-time practice, his fifteen years of
being Of Counsel to a labor and employment firm, and the more than fifty labor and
employment roundtables he has hosted.
178. Id.
179. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998).
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employer. Further, while human resource (HR) professionals are typically loath to
admit as much publicly, common sense and experience imply that HR professionals
are very reluctant to hire applicants who have brought actions against their former
employer.180 Thus, while politicians and academics may push for greater
transparency regarding sexual harassment claims, many employees will likely push
equally hard against calls for increased disclosures. Indeed, the Bloomberg Daily
Labor Report published a study showing an increase in the number of employees
wishing to file their cases as John or Jane Doe.181 Moreover, even the EEOC’s policy
tilts toward privacy when it comes to resolved EEOC harassment charges and
settlements.182
The absence, or increased cost of, NDAs is a disincentive to settle. The tax code
change reduces the likelihood of settlements by increasing the costs of settlements
that include NDAs and, on balance, discouraging employers from settling at the
margin. An employer who sees the cost of a settlement rising because of the NDA,
or fears that any settlement implies an admission, may refuse to settle and instead
pursue a summary judgment motion. Thus, the parties will endure all forms of
discovery—depositions, interrogatories, document requests, etc.—and will have to
stay in a case longer than most employees might otherwise prefer. Reluctance to
settle on the part of employers increases the litigation costs for employees. If
employees see their reports of harassment turning, literally, into public federal cases,
they may be incentivized to not report workplace harassment and to either endure
the conduct or simply walk away and look for a new job. Thus, as a society, this “fix”
to the problem of employers sweeping allegations of or, worse, actual sexual
harassment under the rug is actually a cost/benefit analysis. Is the benefit of
increasing the expense of privacy for employers worth the cost of employers refusing
to settle and/or employees being reluctant to report, pursue, and litigate claims of
harassment?
Thus, while the increased transparency debate is relatively simple to articulate, it
remains comparatively difficult to resolve. While employees183 and employers are
often better off if they can resolve the case with limited publicity, broader social

180. Although it is unlawful retaliation to refuse to hire an applicant because he or she filed
an action against a former employer, failure to hire suits are difficult to win, and HR
professionals are rarely concerned that a current or past litigant will file another lawsuit for
failure to hire.
181. Anonymous Workplace Harassment Suits Double in the #MeToo Era, BLOOMBERG
L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (July 29, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/anonymous-workplace-harassment-suits-double-in-metoo-era
[https://perma.cc
/BWB4-KTAB].
182. Questions and Answers – Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/qanda_foiarequest.cfm
[https://perma.cc/KP9Y-Y7QX]. The EEOC clearly states that they “will not disclose to the
public charged of employment discrimination, charge conciliation information, and
unaggregated EEO survey data.” Id.
183. Some plaintiffs lawyers argue would argue that privacy impedes the employees’
abilities to prove their cases. Doug Wigdor at the Cornell ADR Roundtable November 2019
in NYC. We contend that a policy that will not allow employees to investigate the elements
of their cases (past actions at the company included) or use their coworkers as witnesses and
resources would violate due process protocols and will not, and should not, be enforceable.
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interests may be served by increased transparency.184 Of course, if increased
transparency results in more victims walking away because of fear of publicity, then
social interests are defeated.
The NDA discussion raises the question—what is the better way to eliminate
harassment: (1) make sure all harassment allegations are public; or (2) reduce actual
or perceived disincentives to report and pursue claims of sexual harassment in the
workplace? The question begs for empirical study and not legislation based on either
assumption or, worse, lack of thought.
C. Defining Sexual Harassment and Liability
While clear answers to persistent problems relating to workplace sexual
harassment are few and far between, what does emerge with greater comparative
clarity are a few key issues that would benefit from focused study. These issues
include a need to gain greater clarity on how best to legally define sexual harassment
and a move to a better standard for liability for employers. While we hope future
research will take a deeper dive into these issues, we have a proposal for each.
Legally actionable sexual harassment is presently defined to include only conduct
that is severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive or hostile environment.185 In
the workplace context, such conduct must be motivated by the victim’s gender.186 In
the last several years numerous jurisdictions have attempted to clarify the law by
addressing the severe or pervasive standard.187 For example, a New York state law
enacted in 2019 changed the standard to “something less than severe or pervasive
that is more than a trivial slight or inconvenience.”188
Efforts, such as those in the New York General Assembly, that tinker with various
components—such as the severe and pervasive element—while remaining moored
in Title VII risk missing a broader and possibly more important point. And this
missing point is aptly illustrated by the facts in Oncale, where the employee was
sodomized with a bar of soap on a regular basis. Despite such outrageous factual
findings, the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Oncale remanded the case back

184. See Prasad, supra note 175, at 2509 (“[F]irst . . . courts should take on a heightened
role in determining whether NDAs in such cases are unconscionable, made under duress, or
unenforceable as against public policy, and; second . . . states, instead of passing laws that
prohibit these NDAs altogether, should pass anti-secrecy laws that would provide the required
deterrence to serial offenders and their lawyers who protect them through the use of these
pernicious contracts.”).
185. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
186. Id. at 751–52.
187. See, e.g., Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 36–41 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009).
188. Alkida Kacani and Gregory Green, Governor Cuomo Proposes to Strengthen
Protections Against Harassment in the Workplace, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN ANNOUNCEMENTS,
https://www.retaillaborandemploymentlaw.com/sexual-harassment/governor-cuomoproposes-to-strengthen-protections-against-harassment-in-the-workplace/ [https://perma.cc
/6TH2-28AG].

1002

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:969

to the trial court for greater factual clarity on the employer’s motivation for the
assaults.189
Perhaps it is time to consider an alternative definition of “sexual harassment” that
dispenses with the need for any factual inquiry into employer motivation for the
alleged conduct and simply holds that severe or pervasive conduct that is sexual in
nature is unlawful. Under such a definition, the Oncale victim would prevail, the
“equal opportunity sexual harasser defense” is no longer viable,190 the cause of action
for sexually charged atmosphere is resurrected, and employees who engage in
consensual affairs are not lawfully subjected to harassment because they were “that
woman” or “that man” as opposed to a woman or a man.
Operationalizing this standard creates two questions that need to be addressed.
The first question is, will it be too difficult to define what is sexual as opposed to
nonsexual conduct? While determining whether conduct is sexual or not will be
difficult in some cases, it will never be as difficult as ascertaining intent. Determining
the nature of the conduct is an objective standard. The judge or jury will not have to
figure out why the alleged harasser engaged in the conduct in question. Instead, the
jury will be asked whether a reasonable employee would find this conduct to be of a
sexual nature.191
An instructive case is Johnson v. Hondo, Inc.,192 where two employees, Johnson
and Hicks, who had a personal dispute, argued with each other using graphic sexual
terms.193 Specifically, Hicks told Johnson, “I am going to make you suck my dick”
and would make Johnson’s girlfriend “suck [Hick’s] dick because she’s got a nice
ass.”194 In return, Johnson called Hicks a “punk,” “faggot,” “fag” and “s.o.b.”195 The
Court found the conduct could not be sexual because despite the graphic nature of
the words, the two men were simply insulting, and not propositioning, each other.196
We contend that any fact finder would come to the same conclusion. Moreover, while
sometimes difficult, it is always possible to make the judgment as to whether
something is sexual or not. Also, over time legal precedent will result in a body of
law that can advise courts and juries. Alternatively, trying to figure out why the men
in Oncale, or in other cases, acted the way they did is often impossible. As previously
stated, trying to understand what a person is thinking is not objective, and precedent
would simply not be helpful as each decision would be limited to the actors and their
specific mindsets in the case.

189. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
190. Of course, the equal opportunity “jerk defense” survives because, to quote a phrase,
“Title VII is not a code of civility.” Yuknis v. First Student, Inc., 481 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir.
2007).
191. Of course, one could also lobby for the reasonable man, woman, or trans standard.
We do not endorse this approach only because we question how, assuming men and women
would label conduct that could be considered sexual differently, a man could determine what
a reasonable woman would find sexual or not. Thus, we propose the reasonable victim or
employee standard.
192. 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997).
193. Id. at 410–11.
194. Id. at 411.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 413.
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Assuming our standard is easier to understand and apply, the second question is
whether the logical extensions of this standard will have a positive effect on the
workplace. We contend it will because overtly sexual conduct that is not motivated
by the employee’s gender, conduct directed at an ex-lover, and sexually charged
conduct will all, if severe or pervasive, be unlawful regardless of why the harasser
engaged in such actions. Thus, people who work will no longer have to fear sexual
assaults in the workplace based on factors other than their gender, will no longer
have to fear that if they engage in a workplace romance that they will be “fair game”
for their ex-lovers and their ex-lover’s colleagues and friends, and will no longer
have to deal with porn or other sexually explicit material in the workplace. While
Justice Scalia may conclude that we have made Title VII into a code of civility,197
we believe that our standard provides employees with a basic, albeit low, level of
professionalism and decorum that will allow people to perform their jobs without
fearing that their most private thoughts and actions will be exploited. We argue that
severe or pervasive sexual conduct has no place in the workplace.
With regard to liability, there is a need to study the effects of imposing a strict
liability standard on employers for workplace sexual harassment. Such calls are not
mere “abstractions” as states such as New York, Illinois, and California have already
implemented such a change.198 While the impulse towards a strict liability regime is
perhaps understandable, careful attention to the possibility of motivating perverse
employer incentives is warranted. The creation of strict liability for employers risks
providing a perverse incentive for employers responding to allegations of
harassment. If employers are strictly liable, then the only way to avoid liability is to
make it more difficult to report harassment and then, if reported, “fix” the
investigation to conclude that the unlawful conduct never occurred. Instead, we
propose eliminating the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense. In so doing,
those employees who wait months or even years to report will not be penalized, and
employers will have every incentive to fully investigate, find the truth, and take the
appropriate action in response to the allegations without fear of such being an
admission of guilt.
Once again, this standard needs further explanation. The best way to explain our
concept is with a hypothetical. Suppose an employee is subjected to a series of
propositions from a supervisor. The supervisor is of similar age and believes that
there may be a connection between the two of them. The employee at first is
marginally interested, but soon decides not to pursue a relationship. The supervisor
persists even after being told to please stop—three weeks later, the employee cannot
take it any longer and thus, pursuant to a comprehensive sexual harassment policy
and training, lodges a complaint. Under a technical reading of Ellerth and Faragher,
the question would be whether the employee’s complaint was “unreasonable”
because of their initial marginal interest. If not, the next question would whether the
employee was unreasonable for waiting three weeks to report the harassment. The
employer would have the perverse incentive to either argue that there was no

197. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
198. See Zakrzewska v. New School, 928 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (N.Y. 2010); Myers v.
Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 512–13 (Ct. App. 2007); Sangamon Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Ill. Hum. Rights Comm’n, 908 N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ill. 2009).
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harassment because of the interest or to attack the victim for not reporting soon
enough. Under our standard, there would be no reason (1) to vilify the employee for
being initially interested in the supervisor; (2) to vilify the employee for waiting a
few weeks to report in the hope that the harassment goes away; and (3) to “cover up”
the harassment because if it occurred, the employer is liable. Instead, the employer
would have two obligations: (1) to make the conduct stop, and (2) to invoke the
appropriate form of discipline to make sure that it does not happen again. If the
employer satisfies its obligations, there is no liability. If the employer does not satisfy
these two obligations, then the employee will be entitled to damages.
Some may argue that our standard is problematic because it would reduce the
employer’s incentives to prevent harassment. We reject that criticism. The first prong
of the Ellerth/Faragher defense requires that the employer exercise reasonable care
to prevent and correct workplace harassment. Employers who do not prevent
harassment because, for example, they do not have a sexual harassment policy, do
not train their employees, do not do background checks during the hiring process, or,
worst of all, knowingly hire or allow harassers to work will always be liable. It’s
those employers who do everything right but still have supervisors engage in
reprehensible behavior that will be able to use our defense. Furthermore, if the
second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense is eliminated, it may make sense to
put more of a prevention obligation on employers. We would encourage such a
change.
There is one problem with our standard. Again, it is best to use a hypothetical.
Assume that the worst type of harassment has occurred: a supervisor raped an
employee. The employer, however, has been as vigilant as possible (e.g., training its
employees and having a sexual harassment policy), but a supervisor still committed
an unspeakable act. Pursuant to the policy, the employee immediately complains to
the employer about the conduct. The employer then questions the supervisor who
admits the crime, The employer fires the supervisor and gives the employee a month
off, and then offers the employee a promotion. The employee sues. Should the
employee be entitled to remuneration from the employer? If one believes the
employee should, then strict liability (with its perverse incentives), and not our
standard, is what one would support. However, if one is willing to live with
employees who suffer from rogue supervisors’ horrific actions being unable to obtain
relief in order for employers to have the motivation to find the truth and then do the
“right” thing, then we contend our standard is best.
CONCLUSION
The law of sexual harassment in terms of what the definition of “sexual
harassment” is, when the employer is liable, and whether NDAs should or should not
be allowed suffers from the fact that it was created by the courts and not Congress.
Now, almost thirty-five years after Meritor, courts have continued to try to shoehorn
their creation into matching with Title VII, resulting in further uncertainty and a
multitude of unacceptable results. Rather than continuing to make an uneasy fit of
court-created sexual harassment law and Title VII, we need research-based
legislation that is grounded in a goal of eliminating sexual harassment.

